Guardando le conclusioni in inglese dello Studio si vede che manca un sistema in Italia per finanziare le imprese 5.0 che si puo' risolvere solo con i fondi pensione e per questo in Italia l'Inps dovrebbe diventare SPA con 20 milioni di azionisti un capitale iniziale di 20 miliardi che arriva 200 miliardi in 5-10 anni e tramite Banca INps dare prestiti da 300 miliardi presi da Banca Europea.In Italia ,abbiamo la CDP che prende i soldi dal risparmio postale ma li investe as usual in fonti fossili e non verdi,mentre Banca Inps dovrebbe finanziare i privati e tutte le infrastrutture non fossili ,da austrade a rete 6G. To support policymakers in developing theirpolicy response to support the corporate sector, we offer: • A set of universal principles to guide the response • A decision framework to follow when designing a response tailored to their own jurisdiction. We also illustrate how these tools could be applied in the context of different archetypal jurisdictions. 7.1 TEN CORE PRINCIPLES FOR POLICYMAKERS We recommend a set of core principles that are critical for success. These fall within three broad areas of focus for policymakers. • Focus on the long-term health of the corporate sector. The duration of the pandemic forces us to focus on structural issues and solvency, rather than buying time through a focus on liquidity. This also means we need to shift from broad-based to targeted measures, allowing reallocation of resources to occur. • Focus on the most productive use of resources. It is critical that public policy is geared at this stage towards a strong economic recovery. This is one reason for taking advantage of private sector capacities where they exist, in order to leverage scarce public resources, as well as make use of private sector expertise to evaluate the viability of businesses. This also means that the choice of strategies aimed at achieving other societal objectives, such as greening of the economy or digitalization, should be based on their synergies with our efforts to accelerate the recovery. Finally, the design of any scheme to support the corporate sector should contain the risks of adverse selection, with weaker players seeking to take greater advantage of such support. • Focus on preventing collateral damage. The main example of this is avoiding unintended consequences for financial stability, including preserving the ability of the financial system to sustain lending and otherwise support the recovery. We believe policymakers should rely on a set of ten core principles to help put into practice these areas of policy focus. 1. Act urgently to tackle the growing corporate solvency crisis. This crisis threatens prolonged economic stagnation, and harm for households and workers, if it precipitates a “cliff edge” wave of insolvencies or the creation of masses of zombie firms. Many measures to support the recovery will take time to deliver and should be initiated early. Some nations have already made significant progress in this area. 2. Carefully target public support to optimize the use of resources and help economies emerge fitter and stronger. Policymakers need to consider how to allocate scarce resources, and how to facilitate appropriate loss absorption by existing stakeholders, since indiscriminate support carries the danger of imposing a significant burden on taxpayers. Not all struggling firms should receive public support. Resources should not be wasted on companies that are ultimately doomed 54 Reviving and Restructuring the Corporate Sector Post-Covid to failure or that do not need public support. Moreover, firms that would otherwise be successful should not receive unjustified windfalls. 3. Adapt to the new business realities rather than trying to preserve the status quo. The business sector that emerges from this crisis should not look exactly like it did before due to permanent effects of the crisis and the pandemic’s acceleration of existing trends such as digitalization. Governments should encourage necessary or desirable business transformations and adjustments in employment. This may require a certain amount of “creative destruction” as some firms shrink or close and new ones open, and as some workers need to move between companies and sectors, with appropriate retraining and transitional assistance. However, even governments that support such adaptation in principle may need to take measures to manage the timing of creative destruction to account for the knock-on effects of excessively rapid shifts, such as for insolvency regimes that could become overwhelmed. 4. Market forces should generally be allowed to operate, but governments should intervene to address market failures that create substantial social costs. Some existing market failures are particularly troublesome in the current crisis, such as the longstanding difficulty in funding SMEs effectively. Other market failures are artifacts of this specific crisis, such as the high degree of uncertainty that can deter private investment. 5. Private sector expertise should be tapped to optimize resource allocation where possible. Properly functioning markets can help allocate resources (and costs) using existing expertise and funding channels. Governments are usually less able to pick winners and losers and to structure funding injections that properly align incentives. Harnessing private sector expertise is also likely to reduce adverse selection problems. When combining private and public sector expertise and resources, often the optimal solution will be to provide government incentives to encourage or channel private sector investment. Some states additionally have substantial investment expertise and financial resources in long-term capital pools, including sovereign wealth funds and development banks, that can complement private sector expertise. 6. Carefully balance the combination of broader national objectives with business support measures. Many countries are interested in using their policy responses to solvency and liquidity crises to accelerate strategic changes, such as the greening of the economy or digitalization. This is a legitimate choice, but requires a careful balancing of the desire to direct the change process against the need to avoid imposing excessive constraints on struggling businesses or too narrow an allocation of support into too few business sectors or specific firms. In many cases, other policy levers may be better suited to advancing national objectives. 7. Minimize risk and maximize upside potential for taxpayers, while ensuring stakeholders share in losses and do not receive unjustified windfalls. Where possible, government support measures should limit risk for taxpayers, such as through staged deployment of funding, and come with some direct upside, such as through a share of future profits. 8. Be mindful of moral hazard issues without undermining the core objectives. Where companies entered the crisis with excessive debt leverage, there is the danger of “bailing out” owners and managers who took too much risk, which could also create moral hazard problems, through the expectation of future rescues. At the same time, governments should avoid an excessive focus on assigning blame or withholding support; such an approach could cripple essential business support measures necessary for the sake of society as a whole. 9. Get the timing right in the staging and longevity of interventions. The duration of the pandemic, the shape of the economic recovery, the long-term consequences for demand, and the structural impacts on businesses are still unknown. Policymakers should move quickly but should design their programs to reflect this uncertainty and to mitigate political and bureaucratic tendencies to make temporary programs effectively permanent. Policy interventions should be designed to phase out when they are no longer needed. Policymakers may also wish to keep some “dry powder” available for later interventions, although this must be balanced against the benefits of the strongest possible early intervention to head off later problems. GROUP OF THIRTY 55 10. Anticipate potential spillovers to the financial sector to preserve its strength and enable it to help drive the recovery. While this is primarily a crisis of nonfinancial firms, government may need to intervene to protect or bolster the ability of the financial sector to support the economic recovery. Further, policy choices should avoid actions that would significantly weaken the financial sector, such as forcing banks to make bad loans as a way of supporting the economy. 7.2 DECISION FRAMEWORK We recommend that policymakers consider nine key questions to help structure decisions regarding how they target, govern, and deliver assistance. Targeting: Which companies to assist, and why? 1. What are your priorities? This includes being clear about attitudes toward firm failure, protecting jobs and assets in SMEs versus large corporates, the importance of broader strategic objectives such as preservation of critical industries or encouraging the greening of the economy, and the balance of cost burden sharing across different stakeholders. 2. What resources do you have available? Clarity over available resources (both domestic and through foreign investment) will drive the targeting and scope of support measures. 3. Where are there market failures with substantial social costs? Identify for different types of firms whether there are sufficiently significant market failures to require interventions, and the barriers to the private sector in resolving them. In addition, identify where the costs of financial distress and the social costs of business failure are substantial. 4. Which firms should be assisted through public policies to address these market failures? Define your policy objectives for the different categories of firms defined by their size, financial constraints, nature of any market failures, and costs of business failure. This will depend on social and political priorities. Governance: Who decides which companies to assist? 5. How should the viability and needs of individual firms be determined, and by whom? Establish whether the private sector can determine the viability and needs of the firms in question, or whether and what governmental action is required. This will depend on local institutional capabilities. Where government does intervene, it should do so in a transparent way, with clear accountability to provide clarity to the market and the wider public. Design and implementation: How to assist them? 6. What public support could be provided? Identify the desired intervention or interventions to support firms in different situations. 7. How should the chosen interventions be structured?Design the delivery of the intervention, making best use of private expertise. The design of the intervention will depend on available government resources, institutional capabilities, and social and political priorities. 8. When should the interventions be made, and for how long? Determine when interventions should be introduced to have the greatest effect at lowest cost, and consider for how long they should last. 9. Are actions needed to prevent spillovers to the financial sector? Identify if there is risk to the health of the financial sector that justifies government action to ensure it remains resilient and capable of supporting the recovery. 7.3 PUTTING THESE RECOMMENDATIONS INTO PRACTICE The “optimal” response will vary by jurisdiction. It will be influenced by dimensions including the magnitude and scope of the pandemic impact, the characteristics of the corporate sector, resource availability and institutional capability to support the policy response, and a range of social and political considerations. 56 Reviving and Restructuring the Corporate Sector Post-Covid Countries with greater fiscal capacity, a stronger marketfocused system with a larger non-bank private capital market, and a healthier banking sector will be best equipped both to rely on market forces to deliver support and to step in with government-backed support where required, for instance, to SMEs without access to private capital markets. Some emerging economies will face highly limited fiscal capacity, poorly developed private capital markets, and a weaker banking sector. In jurisdictions facing these constraints, policy priorities are likely to focus on efforts to extend sovereign borrowing capacity to allow provision of some government-backed support in highly targeted areas, and instituting appropriate restructuring procedures.